

SENATORS OPPOSE A SUPER-CABINET TO AID PRESIDENT

**Jackson Panel Favors Using
Wider Executive Power In
Forming Security Policy**

AGENCIES' ROLE PRAISED

**Study Urges Heads of State
and Defense Departments
to Expand Cooperation**

*will be found on Page 15.
Excerpts from policy study*

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Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 5—The President needs more help in formulating policy, a Senate subcommittee said today. But he will not get it by creating "super-Cabinet" positions in the White House, the Senator said.

"The President's best hope," said the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, "lies along another path—strengthening the traditional means of executive power."

This was the essence of a nine-page, briskly written study entitled, "The Secretary of State and the National Security Policy Process." It is the latest in a series issued by a Government Operations subcommittee headed by Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington.

Proposals Understandable

The subcommittee said that the numerous proposals for creating in the White House "a grand council" of wise men, a super-Cabinet or "First Secretary" were understandable enough.

They arose, the subcommittee said, out of a desire to cut through "the exuberant growth" of interagency coordinating committees that have sprouted up because of the reach and complexity of foreign relations today.

The Senators conceded that such committees had proved a "foul-up factor" in policy-making and that "they have exacted a heavy price in terms of loss of individual responsibility, excessive compromise and general administrative sluggishness."

Nevertheless, they contended, the proposed remedy of a White House super-staff would increase rather than reduce the President's burdens. They wrote:

"In the American system, there is no satisfactory alternative to primary reliance on the great departments, and their vast resources of experience and talent, as instruments for policy development and execution."

Substitutes Unsatisfactory

"At the same time, there is no satisfactory substitute for the budgetary process and the staff work of Presidential aides as instruments for pulling departmental programs together in a truly Presidential program, for prodding the departments when necessary and for checking on their performance."

The study is expected to have great interest here because it reflects the ideas of Richard E. Neustadt of Columbia University, one of the subcommittee's consultants. His book, "Presidential Power," has had considerable influence on President Kennedy. It is worth noting that some of the subcommittee's recommendations have al-

ready been put into effect by the President.

For example, the subcommittee recommended that the principal departments dealing with national security should have more high-level officials—some from private life and some from career services—who had experience in more than one agency and thus could see the problem whole.

Dillon's Experience Cited

This, it is noted here, is what the President has evidently attempted in many of his appointments. Thus Douglas Dillon, a political appointee who was formerly Under Secretary of State, is now Secretary of the Treasury. Moreover, he has brought to the Treasury as Assistant Secretary John M. Leedy, a career official who was one of his chief aides at the State Department.

Again, Paul H. Nitze, a former head of the State Department's policy planning staff, has been made an Assistant Secretary of Defense for international security affairs. He has as an assistant, William P. Bundy, who has had experience in the Central Intelligence Agency. In the White House, McGeorge Bundy and Walt W. Rostow, both of Harvard, have been foreign-policy consultants for Government departments and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Thus, observers here note, the President has evidently sought to achieve a kind of "quadrangulation" of policy: the White House, State, Defense and Treasury—by putting in key positions men who know each other well and have had expe-

rience in more than one department.

The Jackson subcommittee also recommended closer cooperation between the Secretaries of State and Defense. This, the subcommittee said, is "the central partnership" of the Cabinet, and it will be "still-born unless the two secretaries themselves set its tone and style."

Their relationship should not be formal, the report said. "They need frequent and unhurried opportunities to talk together, think together and plan together," it was suggested.

It is well-known here that the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and the former Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson never had his relationship. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, it is said here, have set out to achieve it.

The Secretary of State, the Jackson subcommittee advises, must seek help from other Cabinet members in arriving at policy recommendations. But his views, the report went on, must be pre-eminently at the White House because, of all the Cabinet, he alone is charged "with looking at our nation as a whole in its relation to the outside world."

However, the subcommittee remarked that the success of the Secretary of State in influencing his colleagues would depend upon the President's confidence in, and reliance on, him. The subcommittee said:

"A secretary who takes this relationship as a reflection by his Cabinet associates and cannot provide detailed day-to-day guidance of national policy. Nor can the President, which has a White House staff, readily or fully assume the role which he has made it impossible for the Secretary to perform for him."

Observers here are waiting with great interest to see whether this kind of relationship develops between the President and the Secretary of State.